Current Circuit Splits
The following pages contain brief summaries of circuit splits
identified by federal court of appeals opinions announced between August
1, 2016 and December 31, 2016. This collection, written by the members
of the Seton Hall Circuit Review, is organized into civil and criminal
matters, and then by subject matter and court.
Each summary briefly describes a current circuit split, and it intended
to give only the briefest synopsis of the circuit split, and not a
comprehensive analysis. This compilation makes no claim to be
exhaustive, but aims to serve the reader well as a referential starting point.
Preferred citation for the summaries below: Circuit Splits, 13 SETON
HALL CIR. REV. [n] (2017).
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CIVIL
ARBITRATION
National Labor Relations Act – Collective Action Waiver: Morris v.
Ernst & Young, LLP, 834 F.3d 975 (9th Cir. 2016)
The 9th Circuit considered whether an employer violates the
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) by requiring employees to sign an
agreement precluding them from bringing a concerted legal claim. Id. at
979. The court noted that the 7th Circuit held that arbitration agreements
requiring employees to bring claims in “separate proceedings” violates the
employees’ rights to engage in concerted activity under the NLRA. Id. at
983. The 2nd, 5th, and 8th Circuits all rejected that argument. Id. at 990
n.16. The court, noting the “well-established principle [that] employees
have the right to pursue work-related legal claims together,” stated that
concerted activity, as “the right of employees to act together,” is an
essential and substantive right established by the NLRA. Id. at 980.
Accordingly, the 9th Circuit sided with the 7th Circuit and held that a
“concerted action waiver violates the NLRA and cannot be enforced.” Id.
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BANKRUPTCY
Compliance – Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act: Kingdom
Fresh Produce, Inc. v. Stokes Law Office, L.L.P. (In re Delta Product,
L.P.), 845 F.3d 609 (5th Cir. 2016)
The 5th Circuit addressed the issue of whether special counsel’s fees
and expenses can be disbursed from a Perishable Agricultural
Commodities Act (PACA) trust fund before all claimants are paid in
whole. Id. at 612. The court noted that the 2nd Circuit found that a PACA
trust is unlike most common law trusts, and “sellers, as trust beneficiaries,
‘are entitled to full payment before trustees may lawfully use trust funds
to pay other creditors.’” Id. at 620 (internal citation omitted). The 2nd
Circuit determined that “a PACA trustee may not use PACA funds to pay
attorney’s fees incurred in collecting accounts receivable held in trust for
a seller of perishable agricultural commodities.” Id. (internal quotations
and citation omitted). The court noted that the 9th Circuit, however, found
that a bank should be compensated for its collection costs because it
performed all the work required to collect the PACA trust assets. Id. The
court noted that the 2nd Circuit and 9th Circuit appear to distinguish
“PACA trustees . . . who owe fiduciary duties to the PACA claims and are
thus aware of the trust provision[, from] those whose primary role is
outside the PACA trustee framework and do not owe duties to the
claimants.” Id. After examining the attorney’s role as Special PACA
Counsel, the 5th Circuit found that while not named “trustee,” the order
appointing the attorney as Special PACA Counsel allowed him to serve as
“the functional equivalent of a PACA trustee.” Id. at 621. The 5th Circuit
agreed with the 2nd Circuit “that a PACA trustee–or in this case, its
functional equivalent–may not be paid from trust assets ‘until full payment
of the sums owing’ is paid to all claimants.” Id. at 622 (internal citation
omitted).
Proof of Claim – Fair Debt Collection Practices Act: Owens v. LVNV
Funding, 832 F.3d 726 (7th Cir. 2016)
The 7th Circuit addressed “whether filing a proof of claim on a stale
debt in bankruptcy is a misleading or deceptive act prohibited” by the Fair
Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA). Id. at 734. The court noted that
the 11th Circuit held that this constitutes a misleading or deceptive act,
while the 2nd and 8th Circuits rejected such an approach. Id. at 735. The
court further emphasized the 8th Circuit’s rejection, which relied on the
2nd Circuit’s opinion, of “a plaintiff-debtor’s request to extend the
FDCPA to time-barred proofs of claim in a case with nearly identical facts
to the cases currently before [the court].” Id. The court distinguished
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between an unsophisticated consumer standard, adopted by the 11th
Circuit, and the competent attorney standard when determining “whether
the communications would be likely to mislead a competent lawyer.” Id.
at 736. The 7th Circuit joined the 2nd and 8th Circuits in holding that
where “a reasonably competent lawyer would have had no trouble
evaluating whether [a] debt was timely,” a proof of claim on a stale debt
is not a deceptive or misleading act prohibited by the FDCPA. Id.
CIVIL PROCEDURE
Heightened Pleading Requirements – False Claims: United States ex
rel. Prather v. Brookdale Senior Living Cmtys., Inc., 838 F.3d 750 (6th
Cir. 2016)
The 6th Circuit addressed whether Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure’s heightened pleading standard, requiring a relator to
“identify an actual false claim,” may be relaxed when the relator “has pled
facts which support a strong inference that a claim was submitted.” Id. at
769. The court reasoned that an exception to the heightened pleading
standards “could be applied when a relator alleges specific personal
knowledge that relates directly to billing practices.” Id. (internal citation
omitted). The court noted that the 8th, 10th, and 11th Circuits have applied
an “across-the-board heightened standard,” while the 1st, 3rd, 5th, 7th, 9th,
and D.C. Circuits have applied an “across-the-board permissive
[standard].” Id. Pointing to 8th, 10th, and 11th Circuit decisions, the court
did note, however, that “[e]very circuit that has applied a heightened
standard, save ours, has retreated from such a requirement in cases in
which other detailed factual allegations support a strong inference that
claims were submitted.” Id. at 772. The 6th Circuit adopted an approach
that, “requires the pleading of representative false claims in the majority
of cases, while . . . recognizing that a relator may nonetheless survive a
motion to dismiss by pleading specific facts based on her personal billingrelated knowledge that support a strong inference that specific false claims
were submitted for payment.” Id. at 773.
Interest on Damage Awards – Jones Act: Nevor v. Moneypenny
Holdings, LLC, 842 F.3d 113 (1st Cir. 2016)
The 1st Circuit addressed whether a plaintiff is entitled to
prejudgment interest on an award of damages under the Jones Act. Id. at
121. The 5th Circuit had held that “a seaman is not entitled to prejudgment
interest when he prevails on parallel Jones Act and unseaworthiness
claims,” while the 2nd Circuit had held that “when a seaman prevails on
both Jones Act and unseaworthiness claims and there are no exceptional
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circumstances militating against an award of prejudgment interest, . . . the
seaman is entitled to prejudgment interest on the total amount of the
award.” Id. at 122. The court began its analysis by noting that “the
damages award straddles both a successful Jones Act claim and a
successful unseaworthiness claim.” Id. at 123. The court next noted that
“[w]hen federal and state claims overlap, the plaintiff may choose to be
awarded damages based on state law if that law offers a more generous
outcome than federal law.” Id. at 124. In the court’s view, the “same
paradigm seems altogether appropriate where, as here, a plaintiff has
prevailed on fully aligned Jones Act and unseaworthiness claims.” Id. As
the plaintiff was entitled to interest on the unseaworthiness claims, the
court joined the 2nd Circuit and held that “when a court, in a bench trial,
awards damages based on mixed Jones Act and unseaworthiness claims,
prejudgment interest is available.” Id. at 123.
Interlocutory Appeals – Appointment of Counsel: Sai v. Transp. Sec.
Admin., 843 F.3d 33 (1st Cir. 2016)
The 1st Circuit addressed whether a denial of appointed counsel to
an anti-discrimination claimant is an immediately reviewable collateral
order. Id. at 35–36 (internal citations omitted). The court noted that the
3rd, 5th, and 9th Circuits allow interlocutory appeals of orders denying
appointment of counsel, while the 6th, 7th, and 11th do not allow
interlocutory appeals of such orders. Id. at 35 (citing Ficken v. Alvarez,
146 F.3d 978, 980 (D.C. Cir. 1998)). The 1st Circuit agreed with the 6th,
7th, and 11th because “a wrongful request for appointed counsel should
not easily escape review after entry of final judgment.” Sai, 843 F.3d at
36. The court disagreed with the 3rd, 5th, and 9th Circuits in finding that
anti-discrimination claims are an immediately reviewable order. Id. The
1st Circuit concluded that “while we decline at this time to join those
circuits treating a denial of appointed counsel to an anti-discrimination
claimant as an immediately reviewable collateral order, we intimate no
doubts about the reviewability of such a denial in an appeal from a final
judgment.” Id. at 36.
Jurisdiction – In Rem & Personal Jurisdiction: United States v.
Batato, 833 F.3d 413 (4th Cir. 2016)
The 4th Circuit addressed whether the district court’s assertion that
it had in rem jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1355(b)(2) was a proper
interpretation of the statute with regard to assets in foreign countries. Id.
at 418. The court noted that the 2nd Circuit read the statute as still
requiring the “traditional paradigm, [that] ‘the court must have actual or
constructive control over the res when an in rem forfeiture suit is
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initiated.’” Id. at 419. The 3rd, 9th, and D.C. Circuits have instead held
that the statute “establishes jurisdiction in those courts,” because § 1355
effectively dispenses with the traditional requirement. Id. In determining
whether the statute addresses venue or jurisdiction, the court looked to the
legislative history and plain meaning of the text. Id. at 420. Accordingly,
the court rejected the 2nd Circuit’s reasoning by holding that “courts may
acquire jurisdiction by operation of the provision.” Id. The 4th Circuit
joined the 3rd, 9th, and D.C. Circuits in holding that the statute establishes
jurisdiction, rather than venue, in certain courts. Id. at 419.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Civil Rights – Prison Litigation Reform Act: Aref v. Lynch, 833 F.3d
242 (D.C. Cir. 2016)
The D.C. Circuit addressed the issue of “whether injuries that are
allegedly neither mental nor emotional are compensable under the [Prison
Litigation Reform Act (PLRA)] without a prior showing of physical
injury.” Id. at 262. The court noted that the 2nd, 3rd, 10th, and 11th
Circuits have held that 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) “precludes compensatory
damages for any claim that does not include physical harm,” and instead,
focus on the “type of injury asserted.” Id. at 262–63 (emphasis in
original). The court further noted that the majority of circuits imply that
mental or emotional injuries encompass a constitutional violation where
there is no physical harm. Id. at 263. The court stated that a minority of
circuits, including the 6th and 7th Circuits, have held that constitutional
violations are distinct from mental or emotional harm. Id. The D.C.
Circuit agreed with the narrow approach of the 6th and 7th Circuits. Id.
The court reasoned that Congress did not intend for physical injury to be
a requirement of every claim. Id. The court stated that if this was
Congress’s intent, “the statute could simply have provided: ‘No Federal
civil action may be brought by a prisoner . . . for any injury suffered while
in custody without a prior showing of physical injury.’” Id. (citations
omitted) (emphasis in original). The court further reasoned that the
“mental and emotional” language is important because other types of
intangible injury claims can be made. Id. at 264. The D.C. Circuit held
that “there exists a universe of injuries that are neither mental nor
emotional and for which plaintiffs can recover compensatory damages
under the PLRA.” Id. at 265.
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Public Health & Welfare Law – Maternity & Children: Nat’l Inst. of
Family & Life Advocates v. Harris, 839 F.3d 823 (9th Cir. 2016)
The 9th Circuit addressed a split regarding the appropriate level of
scrutiny to apply to abortion-related disclosure cases. Id. at 837. The court
noted that the 5th and 8th Circuits “applied a ‘reasonableness’ test when
determining whether an abortion-related disclosure law violated
physicians’ First Amendment rights.” Id. at 837. The court also noted that
the 4th Circuit ruled that the Supreme Court’s previous decisions
in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833 (1992) and Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007) did not
announce a level of scrutiny to apply in abortion-related disclosure cases.
Id. at 838. The 9th Circuit agreed with the 4th Circuit’s interpretation that
the Supreme Court did not clearly speak to the level of scrutiny to apply
in these types of cases. Id. Therefore, the 9th Circuit joined the 4th Circuit
and applied intermediate scrutiny to the disclosures. Id.
Standing – Article III: Galaria v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 663 F.
App’x 384 (6th Cir. 2016)
The 6th Circuit addressed whether an increased risk of identity theft
satisfies the injury requirement to establish Article III standing. Id. at 388.
The court noted that the 7th and 9th Circuits held that an increased risk of
identity theft satisfies the injury requirement for Article III standing, while
the 3rd Circuit held otherwise. Id. at 389. The court reasoned that the
Supreme Court has “found standing based on a ‘substantial risk’ that the
harm will occur, which may prompt plaintiffs to reasonably incur costs to
mitigate or avoid that harm” even when it is not “literally certain the harm
they identify will come about.” Id. at 388. The court further reasoned that
“[w]here a data breach targets personal information, a reasonable
inference can be drawn that the hackers will use the victims’ data for the
fraudulent purposes alleged in Plaintiff’s complaints.” Id. The court also
noted that “when plaintiffs already know that they have lost control of their
data, it would be unreasonable to expect [them] to wait for actual misuse,”
rather, it is reasonable to expect them to “expend time and money to
monitor their credit, check their bank statements, and modify their
financial accounts.” Id. Therefore, the 6th Circuit held that an increased
risk of identity theft satisfy the Injury requirement for Article III standing
because the costs reasonably incurred by plaintiffs are concrete injuries
“suffered to mitigate an imminent harm.” Id. at 389.
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Statutory Interpretation – Vagueness Doctrine: Golicov v. Lynch, 837
F.3d 1065 (10th Cir. 2016)
The 10th Circuit addressed whether “the [Immigration and
Nationality Act’s (INA)] definition of ‘crime of violence,’ 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(43)(F), which expressly incorporates 18 U.S.C. § 16(b)’s
definition of that same term, is unconstitutionally vague in light of the
Supreme Court’s decision in Johnson [v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551
(2015)].” Lynch, 837 F.3d at 1068. The court began its inquiry with a
determination as to the applicability of the vagueness doctrine, which is
derived from the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, to
immigration proceedings. Id. The court joined with the 6th and 9th
Circuits in finding that “because deportation strips a non-citizen of his
rights, statutes that impose this penalty are subject to vagueness challenges
under the Fifth Amendment.” Id. at 1069. The 10th Circuit then
considered whether the residual definition of “crime of violence” under
§ 1101(a)(43)(F) of the INA, which mirrors a residual clause rendered
unconstitutional by Johnson, was also unconstitutionally vague as applied
in the context of immigration proceedings. Id. at 1070. The court noted
that both the 6th and 9th Circuits have held that the INA’s residual clause
in § 1101(a)(43)(F) is unconstitutional, as the INA expressly incorporates
the definition of § 16(b), which was similar to the residual clause at issue
in Johnson. Id. at 1071. The court also noted that the 5th and 7th Circuits
have considered “similar Johnson-based vagueness challenges” to a
statute also incorporating § 16(b)’s definition of “crime of violence”—the
7th Circuit finding § 16(b) and the residual clause in Johnson “materially
indistinguishable,” while the 5th Circuit labeling them as “textually
distinct.” Id. at 1072 (internal quotations omitted). The court agreed with
the 6th, 7th, and 9th Circuits’ interpretation of § 16(b), and concluded “that
§ 16(b) is not meaningfully distinguishable from the [Johnson] residual
clause and that, as a result, § 16(b), and by extension § 1101(a)(43)(F),
must be deemed unconstitutionally vague in light of Johnson.” Id.
EMPLOYMENT LAW
ERISA Benefits – Settlement Procedure: Rothstein v. Am. Int’l Grp.,
Inc., 837 F.3d 195 (2d Cir. 2016)
The 2nd Circuit considered whether Employment Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) benefit plans may be deemed
“affiliates” of the company that sponsors them, for purposes of
determining the distribution of a class action settlement. Id. at 198. The
court noted that this inquiry turned on the degree of sponsor’s “control”
over the plan. Id. at 206–07. The court also noted that the 7th Circuit, in
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reaching this inquiry, held that a company had control over a benefit plan
it had sponsored because it had appointed the plan’s administrator, a
committee which “serve[d] at the pleasure of [the company’s] Board of
Directors,” and therefore, the plan was deemed an “affiliate” of the
company. Id. at 207 (internal quotations omitted). The court declined to
adopt the approach of the 7th Circuit, however, finding that to the extent
that its approach can be interpreted as declaring that “all ERISA plans are
all ‘affiliates’ of their sponsors,” such an interpretation fails to account for
the statutory limitations that ERISA imposes on the sponsor’s control over
a benefit plan. Id. Rather, the court determined that ERISA’s
requirements, which were designed to insulate the plan from being
manipulated in a manner consistent with the interests of the plan’s sponsor,
reinforce that the sponsor’s control over the plan is “specifically
circumscribed” to prevent management of the plan in a way that would
adversely affect the plan’s beneficiaries. Id. at 208. Thus, the 2nd Circuit
held that a sponsor’s ability to appoint and remove the plan’s
administrator, or even to disband the plan entirely, did not warrant a
finding of “control” sufficient to deem the plan an “affiliate” of the
sponsor company because ERISA imposes a “strict fiduciary duties [to
block] such corporate influence.” Id. at 209.
SECURITIES LAW
Administrative Law Judge Discretion – Administrative Proceedings:
Bandimere v. United States SEC, 844 F.3d 1168 (10th Cir. 2016)
The 10th Circuit addressed whether the SEC’s Administrative Law
Judges (ALJs) are inferior officers and must therefore be appointed
properly under the Appointments Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Id. at
1170. The D.C. Circuit held that ALJs were employees rather than inferior
officers because they were unable to render final decisions. Id. at 1182.
The court relied on the holding in Freytag v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, 501 U.S. 868 (1991), that the duties of IRS special trial judges
(STJs), who are classified as inferior officers, and reasoned that they are
analogous to the SEC’s ALJs. Bandimere, 844 F.3d at 1182. As a result,
the court reasoned ALJs should also be classified as inferior officers and
therefore subject to the Appointments Clause. Id. at 1179. The 10th
Circuit disagreed with the D.C. Circuit, citing Freytag, which utilized a
number of factors to determine inferior officer status, only one of which
was the ability to make final decisions. Id. (international citations
omitted). The 10th Circuit declined to follow the D.C. Circuit and held
that SEC ALJs are inferior officers subject to the Appointments Clause.
Id. at 1188.
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CRIMINAL
CONSPIRACY
Juvenile Delinquency Act – Relevancy of Pre-Majority Acts: United
States v. Camez, 839 F.3d 871 (9th Cir. 2016)
The 9th Circuit addressed whether the Juvenile Delinquency Act
(“JDA”) precludes pre–majority conduct as substantive proof in a
conspiracy case spanning the defendant’s eighteenth birthday. Id. at 874.
The court noted that the D.C. Circuit held that under the JDA, only post–
majority acts could be considered as proof of guilt in an adult proceeding
while the 1st, 2nd, 6th, 10th, and 11th Circuits found that the JDA imposed
no limitation on the use of pre–majority conduct as proof of guilt in adult
proceedings. Id. at 875–877. The court agreed with the 10th and 11th
Circuits in finding that precluding pre–majority conduct would
erroneously suggest that Congress intended the JDA to substantively alter
the standard for proving conspiracy cases spanning a defendant’s
eighteenth birthday. Id. at 875. To that end, the court was persuaded that
pre–majority acts could substantively prove crimes spanning a defendant’s
eighteenth birthday because it found the scenario analogous to contract
ratification—much as a minor could ratify an illegally formed contract
upon attaining majority, so to could a pre–majority crime be ratified by
post-majority involvement. Id. at 876. Therefore, the court joined the 1st,
2nd, 6th and 11th Circuits and found that the JDA did not preclude the use
of pre-majority acts as proof of guilt in a conspiracy case spanning a
defendant’s eighteenth birthday, but declined to determine what
limitations the JDA placed on the use of such proof. Id. at 876–877.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Custody – Alien Detention: Preap v. Johnson, 831 F.3d 1193 (9th Cir.
2016)
The 9th Circuit analyzed the scope of the mandatory detention
provision, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1), of the Immigration and Naturalization
Act (“INA”). Id. at 1199. Specifically, § 1226(c)(1) mandates the
Attorney General detain any alien who commits a crime enumerated in the
provision, “when the alien is released” from criminal custody. Id. The
circuits are split as to whether the “when the alien is released” language in
the mandatory detention provision is a “time-limiting clause”—meaning
such detention is only mandatory if it occurs immediately upon a subject
alien’s release from criminal custody—or, whether the mandatory
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detention provision is a “duty-triggering clause,” creating a duty to detain
the subject alien at any time after they are released from criminal custody.
Id at 1200. The 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 10th Circuits have held that the
mandatory detention provision is a duty-triggering clause, and that
authority to detain is not lost even when not done promptly upon release
from criminal custody. Id. at 1196. The 1st Circuit held, however, that
the mandatory detention provision is a time-limiting clause, only granting
authority to detain if done promptly after a subject alien’s release from
criminal custody. Id. at 1196–97. The 9th Circuit sided with the 1st
Circuit, stating that the legislature acts deliberately in selecting the
words—and their meaning—in a statute, and thus included “when the alien
is released” so as to authorize mandatory detention only at that time when
the alien is released. Id. at 1200.
Habeas Corpus – Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: Visciotti v.
Martel, 839 F.3d 845 (9th Cir. 2016)
The 9th Circuit addressed whether an ineffective assistance of
counsel claim, in regards to cause and prejudice, receives review in
deference to the state court determination considering the Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). Id. at 864. The court
noted that the 7th Circuit determined that ineffective assistance of counsel
claims in the cause and prejudice context employ a deferential standard of
review, while the 6th and 3rd Circuits found a de novo standard of review
proper. Id. at 864 n.13. The 9th Circuit agreed with the 6th and 3rd
Circuits in finding that the AEDPA does not establish a statutory high
hurdle for the issue of cause. Id. The court found that the AEDPA did not
change the cause and prejudice standard as there was no indication in the
statute to the contrary. Id. at 865. Thus, the 9th Circuit concluded
ineffective assistance of counsel claims in the cause and prejudice context
receive de novo review. Id.
Habeas Corpus – Scope of Review: Wilson v. Warden, 834 F.3d 1227
(11th Cir. 2016)
The 11th Circuit addressed whether a federal habeas court should
look through a state appellate court’s summary decision denying a
petitioner relief to the reasoning in a lower state court decision when
deciding whether the state appellate court’s decision is entitled to
deference under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Id. at 1247. The court noted that
that the 5th, 4th, 9th, 1st, and 7th Circuits have held that courts must
“review the last reasoned state court decision.” Id. at 1241. The court,
however, also points out that only the 4th and 9th Circuits have expressly
applied this this rule. Id. The court reasoned that “appellate courts may
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affirm for different reasons, presuming that state appellate courts affirm
only for the precise reasons given by a lower court deprives them of the
benefit of the doubt,” that is required. Id. at 1242. As such, the 11th
Circuit disagreed with the other circuits and held that federal habeas courts
need not look through a summary decision on the merits to review the
reasoning of the lower state court. Id.
Search and Seizure – Trash Pull Evidence: United States v. Abernathy,
843 F.3d 243 (6th Cir. 2016)
The 6th Circuit addressed “whether and under what circumstances
trash pull evidence, standing alone, can establish probable cause to search
a home.” Id. at 252. The court noted that the 8th Circuit had determined
that probable cause existed in a analogous factual situation because “not
only [did] the presence of discarded marijuana stems and seeds reasonably
suggest that ongoing marijuana consumption or trafficking is occurring
within the premises, but the simple possession of marijuana seeds is itself
a crime under both federal and state law.” Id. The 6th Circuit, however,
noted that they had previously noted in dicta “that mere trash pull
evidence, standing alone, is insufficient to create probable cause to search
a residence.” Id .at 253. The court further reasoned that “although the
trash pull evidence certainly suggested that someone in the residence had
smoked marijuana recently, that fact alone [did] not create an inference
that the residence contained additional drugs.” Id. at 255. As such, the
court held that the trash pull evidence was insufficient, alone, to establish
probable cause. Id. at 256.
Sentencing Guidelines – Habeas Corpus Petition: Hill v. Masters, 836
F.3d 591 (6th Cir. 2016)
The 6th Circuit examined the right of a prisoner to bring successive
habeas corpus petitions under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 to challenge the
misapplication of a sentence enhancement. Id. at 592. The court noted
that the 4th Circuit recently held that a criminal defendant who has not
shown actual innocence relating to the underlying conviction can not be
found “actually innocent” of a sentence enhancement. Id. at 598.
Alternatively, the 7th Circuit found a petition challenging the careeroffender enhancement was sufficient where it satisfied three conditions
under the savings-clause exception, allowing relief under §2241. Id. at
599. The court reasoned that serving a sentence under mandatory
guidelines, which were subsequently lowered by retroactive Supreme
Court precedent, is similar to serving a sentence above the statutory
maximum in that both “are beyond what is called for by law.” Id. at 599.
Therefore, the court sided with the 7th Circuit in holding that a petition
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can indeed be brought under § 2241 in certain circumstances. Id. at 599—
600. The court held that such a petition can be brought if: “(1) prisoners
who were sentenced under the mandatory guidelines regime pre-United
States v. Booker, (2) who are foreclosed from filing a successive petition
under § 2255, and (3) when a subsequent, retroactive change in statutory
interpretation by the Supreme Court reveals that a previous conviction is
not a predicate offense for a career-offender enhancement.” Id.
Statutory Interpretation – Sentencing Enhancement Guidelines:
United States v. Canelas-Amador, 837 F.3d 668 (6th Cir. 2016)
The 6th Circuit addressed the issue of which definition of
“conviction” applies when a court is determining whether a “‘Waiver of
Trial by Jury and Acceptance of Plea of Guilty’ constitute[s] a ‘conviction
for a felony that is . . . a crime of violence,’ mandating a sixteen-point
[sentencing] enhancement under the guideline provision applicable to
Illegal Reentry. Id. at 670. The court noted that the 4th, 5th, 10th, and
11th Circuits determined that the Immigration and Naturalization Act,
specifically 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A) definition of “conviction” controls,
while the 1st, 2nd, and 9th Circuits have applied the definition in the U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 4A1.2(a)(4). Id. The 6th Circuit
reasoned that in this case, due the insufficiency of the tools of statutory
interpretation, “there remains a not insignificant doubt as to which
definition should apply.” Id. at 674. The 6th Circuit explained that “when,
in criminal cases, the tools of statutory interpretation do not resolve a
question, where significant doubt or uncertainty lingers, [the court] must
construe the provision in favor of the defendant.” Id. Therefore, the 6th
Circuit agreed with the 4th, 5th, 10th, and 11th Circuits that “the more
restrictive definition set forth in § 1101(a)(48)(A) applies.” Id.
EVIDENCE
Prior Act – Nolo Contendere Pleas: United States v. Green, 842 F.3d
1299 (11th Cir. 2016)
The 11th Circuit analyzed “whether a criminal conviction pursuant
to a nolo [contendere] plea can be admitted to prove a prior act under
[FRE] 404(b).” Id. at 1311. The 8th Circuit had held that there is no
meaningful difference between guilty convictions—which are permissible
to use under Rule 404(b)—and convictions based on nolo pleas, since
nolo pleas “constitute[] an admission of ‘every essential element of the
offense (that is) well pleaded in the charge.’” Id. at 1316. The 9th Circuit
held that nolo convictions could not prove a crime was committed, absent
other evidence. Id. The 9th Circuit was persuaded by the fact that Rule
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803(22) “provides an exception to the hearsay rule for judgments of felony
conviction resulting from guilty pleas, but not nolo pleas,” and thus nolo
pleas ought not be admitted to prove the truth of the matters they assert.
Id. The 11th Circuit agreed with the 9th Circuit, similarly grounding its
conclusion in Rule 803(22), which the court found strongly supported the
“argument that a conviction based on a nolo plea should not as a general
matter, be considered for the truth of the matter asserted.” Id. at 1318–19.
The 11th Circuit held that “to have Rule 404(b) prior act evidence
admitted, the proponent need only provide enough evidence for the trial
court to be able to conclude that the jury could find, by a preponderance
of the evidence, that the prior act had been proved.” Id. at 1319.

